All major Israeli contenders in the upcoming election have publicly ruled out the creation of a Palestinian state, a development that has intensified pressure on the European Union to move beyond rhetoric about reforms and consider targeted sanctions against Israel's occupation policies.

The declaration came from former defence minister Gadi Eisenkot, who told voters he would not allow a Palestinian state under any circumstances. Similar statements have been made by hard‑line figures such as Bezalel Smotrich and even members of the so‑called progressive camp, including Yair Golan. The consensus among the candidates reflects a broader Zionist position that views any form of Palestinian self‑determination as incompatible with Israel's security narrative.

Why the EU's current approach is seen as insufficient

For decades the international community, including the EU, has endorsed a two‑state solution based on the 1967 borders. Yet, despite repeated United Nations resolutions and the International Court of Justice's ruling that the occupation is illegal, concrete steps to end the occupation have remained limited. Instead, EU officials have largely focused on encouraging "Palestinian reforms" and supporting people‑to‑people programmes, measures that critics argue merely postpone the core issue of sovereignty.

"The EU's language has shifted from 'pressure' to 'reforms'," said a spokesperson for a European trade‑union federation. "That change does not reflect the reality on the ground, where settlement expansion continues and the cost of occupation remains lower than the cost of ending it."

Sanctions have been discussed in Brussels for years, but political sensitivities and strong lobbying from Israeli interest groups have kept them at bay. The latest election cycle, however, has revived calls for a more robust response, with several European parliamentarians urging the Commission to adopt measures that would make the status quo financially and diplomatically untenable for Israel.

What the election could mean for the Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority (PA), established under the Oslo Accords in 1994 as an interim body, faces an uncertain future. Israeli plans to weaken the PA's institutional capacity have been a constant feature of the post‑Oslo era. If a right‑wing coalition wins, the PA could be reduced to a security‑coordination partner, stripped of any meaningful authority to pursue statehood.

Conversely, a more centrist or left‑leaning Israeli government might keep the PA alive as a bargaining chip, but only insofar as it serves Israeli security interests. In that scenario, the PA would continue to operate without the power to negotiate a genuine end to the occupation, effectively cementing a status quo that favours Israeli settlement activity while leaving Palestinians without a viable path to sovereignty.

Palestinian leaders have signalled that the upcoming elections in November will centre on a platform of "internationally imposed reforms" tied to financial aid. Critics warn that such reforms, dictated by external donors rather than by Palestinian civil society, risk entrenching a system where the PA's survival depends on compliance with Israeli demands rather than on the pursuit of national liberation.

European public opinion and the growing debate on sanctions

Recent surveys across the EU show a marked shift in public attitudes toward Israel's settlement policies. A majority of respondents in Germany, France and the Netherlands now support measures such as banning products made in Israeli settlements and restricting arms sales to the Israeli defence industry.

European NGOs have seized on this momentum, filing legal challenges against companies that profit from settlement construction and lobbying for the EU to invoke the EU‑Israel Association Agreement to impose trade restrictions. "When the cost of occupation becomes higher than the cost of compliance, the calculus changes for both governments and businesses," explained a senior analyst at a Brussels‑based think‑tank specialising in EU foreign policy.

Nevertheless, member states remain divided. While countries like Sweden and Ireland have already taken steps to label settlement goods, others, notably Germany, have been more cautious, fearing repercussions for bilateral trade and security cooperation. The German debate has intensified after reports that some German banks continue to hold Israeli sovereign bonds, a practice that human‑rights groups argue legitimises the occupation.

Implications for European industry and workers

Should the EU move toward targeted sanctions, the impact would ripple through European supply chains. Construction firms involved in settlement projects could lose contracts, and European investors might face divestment pressures. Trade unions across the continent have begun to coordinate campaigns urging their members to refuse work on projects linked to the occupation, arguing that complicity undermines European values of human rights and social justice.

At the same time, the Israeli tech sector, a major export earner for the EU, could experience indirect effects if broader restrictions on Israeli defence and security equipment are introduced. While many European workers benefit from jobs tied to Israeli technology, a shift in policy could force companies to reassess partnerships, potentially leading to job losses in certain sectors.

International legal framework and the case for action

The New York Declaration on the two‑state solution and the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the illegality of the occupation provide a legal basis for EU action. Advocates argue that the EU, as a bloc that prides itself on upholding international law, has a duty to translate these legal instruments into concrete policy.

"It is not enough to repeat the language of 1993," said a senior counsel at a European human‑rights organisation. "The EU must use the tools at its disposal, trade measures, investment screening, and targeted sanctions, to make the occupation financially unsustainable."

Such a stance would also align the EU with a growing global consensus that the occupation is a breach of international law. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self‑determination, and a number of EU member states have already recognised the State of Palestine, albeit symbolically.

What comes next for the EU and the Middle East peace process

As the Israeli election draws near, the EU faces a choice: continue to champion a two‑state solution in principle while offering only vague reform proposals, or adopt a more assertive stance that could reshape the dynamics of the conflict. The decision will have ramifications not only for the Palestinians but also for European foreign‑policy credibility, trade relations, and the broader debate over how the bloc should respond to violations of international law.

In the short term, the European Parliament is expected to debate a resolution calling for a review of EU‑Israel trade agreements, with particular focus on settlement‑related products. Meanwhile, the European Commission is under pressure to publish a detailed strategy on how to implement sanctions, should a consensus emerge among member states.

For workers and consumers across Europe, the outcome could mean a shift in the availability of certain goods, changes in investment portfolios, and a renewed public discussion about the ethical dimensions of trade. For the Palestinian people, it could represent a rare opportunity to see the international community move beyond symbolic statements and take steps that directly challenge the structures sustaining the occupation.

Whether the EU will seize that moment remains to be seen, but the convergence of electoral politics in Israel, shifting public opinion in Europe, and an increasingly assertive legal framework suggests that the status quo is under growing scrutiny.