European Union officials have long spoken of a "Northern Strategy" for the Arctic, yet the practical tools needed to work with the region's closest partners remain absent. The recent Icelandic referendum on EU membership, which resulted in a narrow rejection, did not create the problem, the gap has existed for years and is now visible in projects ranging from under‑sea cable protection to satellite launches.

When a submarine communications cable was sabotaged beneath the Baltic Sea last year, Brussels did not convene an emergency summit. Within days, a coalition of ten states, including the United Kingdom, Norway and several EU members, had set up a tracking system to monitor vessels in the area. The initiative was run by the Joint Expeditionary Force, a UK‑led military grouping, and operated alongside NATO's own patrols. Neither effort required EU approval, underscoring how security cooperation in the north can function without the bloc's direct involvement.

Norway's spaceport illustrates the rule‑book gap

Norway provides a concrete example of the structural blind spot. The Andøya Spaceport, located on the island of Andøya, is widely regarded as one of Europe's most suitable sites for launching low‑earth‑orbit satellites. The EU's IRIS satellite programme, designed to deliver secure communications across the continent, explicitly assumes that launch facilities will be situated within member states. Consequently, despite Norway's technical suitability and its long‑standing partnership with European defence and research bodies, the country cannot host IRIS launches.

The exclusion is not the result of a political veto from Oslo. It stems from a rulebook that recognises only two categories, "member" and "non‑member", and treats the latter as a monolithic block. Norway, Iceland and the United Kingdom sit in a middle ground: they are sovereign European states with deep economic, security and scientific ties to the EU, yet they are not members and therefore fall outside the legal framework that governs many EU programmes.

Financial tools exist, but the legal hook does not

Technical solutions for the Arctic are already on the table. The EU could allocate funding for the protection of under‑sea cables, finance the development of critical‑mineral mines in Greenland, or amend the IRIS regulations to allow launches from Andøya. None of these measures require unanimity among the 27 member states; they can be adopted through the usual qualified‑majority voting procedures in the Council or via Commission proposals.

What is missing is a formal mechanism that recognises the special status of these non‑member neighbours. Without such a mechanism, any attempt to channel money or regulatory change must be negotiated on a case‑by‑case basis, creating uncertainty for partners and slowing down projects that have clear benefits for European security and the green transition.

Greenland, Denmark and the EU's first joint step

On 7 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen travelled to Nuuk and signed a €200 million partnership deal with Greenland. The agreement was co‑signed by Denmark's prime minister, reflecting the constitutional reality that Greenland's foreign and security policy is formally the responsibility of Copenhagen. By involving Denmark, the EU signalled that it can work with Arctic territories when the appropriate sovereign partner is included.

However, the deal also highlighted the need for a broader, institutionalised approach. The partnership was framed as part of Europe's "Northern Neighbourhood", a term that von der Leyen's own communications team used on social media. The label suggests a distinct policy area, yet no dedicated budget line or decision‑making body currently exists to give it substance.

Upcoming policy windows

Two critical moments loom in the autumn. The EU is expected to publish a new security strategy in early October, followed shortly by an updated Arctic policy. Both documents will be judged against the commitments made at the recent summit in Finland, where European leaders gathered solely to discuss the High North. If the strategies merely name‑check Norway, Iceland and the United Kingdom without creating concrete cooperation structures, the status quo will persist.

Conversely, a genuine "Northern Cooperation" framework could allocate a specific budget, establish joint decision‑making panels, and grant partner states co‑ownership of projects from the outset. Such an arrangement would move beyond symbolic references and provide the legal certainty needed for long‑term investments in renewable energy, mineral extraction and maritime safety.

Why the Iceland referendum matters little for EU policy

Iceland's vote on 29 August was framed in domestic terms, fish quotas, mortgage rates and the desire to retain sovereignty over natural resources. While the outcome means that full EU membership is off the table for the foreseeable future, it does not alter the structural challenge the bloc faces in the Arctic. Whether Iceland eventually joins the EU or not, the EU will still need a workable partnership model for a country that sits on the edge of the continent and controls vast exclusive economic zones.

The referendum therefore does not close the gap; it merely confirms that the solution cannot rely on accession talks. The real task is to design a partnership tier that accommodates states that will never become members but whose strategic importance is undeniable.For workers and communities across Europe, the stakes are tangible. Secure under‑sea cables underpin the digital economy, affecting everything from banking to remote work. Reliable satellite communications are essential for emergency services in remote Arctic towns and for monitoring climate change impacts. Investment in Greenland's mineral sector could create jobs and supply the raw materials needed for the EU's green transition, but only if projects can be financed and regulated under a clear, predictable framework.

In the absence of such a framework, private investors may shy away, fearing regulatory uncertainty, while national governments could resort to ad‑hoc arrangements that lack transparency. The result would be slower progress on climate goals, higher costs for consumers and a weakened strategic position for Europe in a region where China and Russia are increasingly active.

What the EU can do now

First, the Commission should draft an amendment to the IRIS programme that explicitly allows launches from non‑member sites that meet safety and security standards. Second, the Council could create a "Northern Cooperation" budget line, similar to the EU's neighbourhood instruments for the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, earmarking funds for infrastructure, research and security projects in the High North. Third, a joint steering committee comprising representatives from the EU, Norway, Iceland and the United Kingdom could be established to oversee the implementation of these programmes, ensuring that decisions are taken collectively rather than imposed from Brussels alone.

These steps would not require treaty changes, only political will. They would also signal to Arctic stakeholders that Europe is capable of flexible, pragmatic cooperation, a message that could counterbalance the growing influence of non‑European powers in the region.

In short, the EU's Arctic dilemma is not a lack of ambition but a missing institutional category for its closest non‑member neighbours. Addressing that gap would unlock funding, streamline regulation and strengthen security cooperation, delivering concrete benefits for European workers, households and the broader climate agenda.