Turkey’s Baykar TB2 unmanned aircraft are being built in European factories – assembled in Italy, fitted with French technology and launched from Italian naval vessels – even as the European Union’s arms‑export regime increasingly yields to market size and NATO considerations.

From suspension to partnership

In October 2019 the EU’s foreign ministers voted unanimously to halt weapons exports to Turkey, citing the country’s military operation in northern Syria. The decision was backed by the EU’s arms‑export rules, which require a human‑rights assessment, but the practical impact of that clause has waned. Since then relations have improved and expanded, and the earlier suspension has not been reinstated.

Industrial realignment

Baykar, the Turkish producer of the TB2, was acquired by Italy’s Piaggio Aerospace and entered a joint venture with Leonardo. The company also signed a memorandum of understanding with France’s Safran, cementing a supply chain that spans the continent. Turkish defence exports have more than tripled since 2021, reaching nine billion euros, and exports to Europe and the United States have almost quadrupled in the same period. Analysts estimate that Turkish firms now supply roughly sixty‑five percent of the world’s armed drones.

NATO summit outcomes

At the most recent NATO summit in Ankara, Turkish defence companies – Aselsan, Roketsan, STM and TÜBİTAK – secured contracts across all five NATO joint weapons programmes. The awards include a twenty‑three‑point‑seven billion‑euro air‑and‑missile‑defence project that also involves Raytheon and Rheinmetall. The three Turkish firms are owned by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, a state‑military holding that channels defence revenue directly to the armed forces.

Strategic calculations

European analysts note that the United States has signalled a reduced forward military presence in Europe, creating strain on the continent’s security architecture. Turkey’s large army and rapidly expanding defence sector are therefore viewed as attractive alternatives. The ability of Turkish firms to quickly integrate sensors, effectors, data links, software and platforms into combat‑relevant, cost‑effective systems is seen as meeting Europe’s urgent need for scalable capabilities.

Human‑rights backdrop

Freedom House rates Turkey as the only NATO member classified as “Not Free” and assigns it the lowest due‑process score worldwide. State authorities control about ninety percent of national media, and the judiciary is dominated by the executive, often disregarding European Court of Human Rights rulings. The 2025 European Commission report highlighted the targeting of opposition figures and the erosion of independent courts.

The European Parliament warned that geopolitical importance cannot offset democratic decline, but no concrete policy changes followed. EU rapporteur Nacho Sánchez Amor has indicated that Brussels has effectively abandoned the prospect of Turkish EU membership, focusing instead on security and migration cooperation.

Political friction and commercial pragmatism

In April 2025 Germany briefly blocked a forty‑billion‑euro Typhoon jet sale to Turkey because of the arrest of opposition mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu; the block was lifted three months later. By October 2025 the United Kingdom concluded a defence deal with Turkey despite a new arrest warrant for the same mayor, a shift linked to a change in German political leadership under Friedrich Merz, who prioritises defence growth over linking arms sales to democratic standards.

Human‑rights violations and diplomatic omission

United Nations investigators have linked Turkish‑made drones to the deaths of sixty civilians at an Ethiopian displacement camp, while Human Rights Watch reported TB2 strikes by Burkina Faso’s military on a market and a funeral. A UN panel also concluded that Turkey breached the arms embargo on Libya. These violations were not addressed in the negotiations that produced the recent Ankara agreements.

Implications for the EU

The EU is advancing its own defence projects while deepening cooperation with Turkey, raising concerns about the credibility of its normative agenda. If arms‑export rules remain subordinate to strategic and commercial interests, the Union risks further damage to its reputation as a human‑rights advocate. For European defence workers the closer ties promise jobs and a stronger industrial base, but also expose the continent to reputational risk.

In the near term Turkish drones will continue to be built in European factories, equipped with French technology and launched from Italian carriers, while the EU’s rule‑of‑law clause in its arms‑export regime becomes less prominent.