Michael Romancov, a political geographer at Charles University in Prague, told Deník N that the Russian state has never abandoned the imperial logic that first emerged in the mid‑sixteenth century. He says the same ideas that once justified the conquest of Kazan and Siberia now underpin the Kremlin's approach to Ukraine, the Arctic and its relations with the West.

Romancov's interview, recorded for a podcast, traced the evolution of Russia from a Muscovite principality into a continental empire, and examined why the scale of that empire remains both a source of strength and a chronic weakness. He warned that the persistence of an expansionist narrative could make the Kremlin's future actions harder to predict, and that European policymakers need to understand the historical roots of Russia's security doctrine.

From a consolidated core to a continental power

According to Romancov, the label "Russian Empire" only appeared officially in 1721 after Peter the Great's triumph over Sweden, but the process of imperial expansion began much earlier. In the 1550s Moscow seized the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates, former fragments of the Golden Horde that had long dominated the steppe. The conquest of these Tatar states, he explained, marked the moment when the Muscovite state shifted from merely gathering the Rus' lands to actively colonising new territories.

The earlier period under Ivan III and Ivan IV (the Terrible) had been about consolidating a core around Moscow, eliminating rivals such as Novgorod and establishing a unified political centre. Once that core was secure, the state turned outward, driven by a belief that a large landmass was essential for security in a hostile neighbourhood.

Why size mattered, and why it became a burden

Romancov highlighted a paradox that has haunted Russia for centuries. The empire's vastness gave it access to valuable resources, first furs from Siberia, later oil and gas, but it also created an administrative nightmare. Governing an area that grew, on average, by 110 sq km a day between 1552 and 1914 required a bureaucracy that could not keep pace with the sheer distances involved.

To compensate, Russian rulers hired foreign experts, especially from Western Europe, to import knowledge of gunpowder, artillery and later railway construction. Yet the empire struggled with low literacy rates and a shortage of trained civil servants, a problem that persisted into the Soviet era and remains evident in today's regional disparities.

Religion as a justification for conquest

Romancov linked the Russian imperial project to the idea of Moscow as the "Third Rome". After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Russian clerics and rulers claimed that the Orthodox faith needed a new centre, and Moscow positioned itself as that beacon. This religious self‑image gave a moral veneer to the annexation of Muslim‑populated territories such as Kazan, where mosques were converted into Orthodox cathedrals in a symbolic reversal of the Ottoman takeover of Hagia Sophia.

He noted that this pattern mirrors the Spanish and Portuguese conquests in the Americas, where the spread of Christianity was used to legitise the seizure of indigenous lands. In both cases, the conquerors presented themselves as civilising agents, a narrative that helped to mask the violence and displacement that accompanied expansion.

From Siberian furs to Arctic hydrocarbons

The early Russian economy relied heavily on the fur trade, which linked Siberian trappers to markets in Europe and China. Romancov argued that the same remote territories that produced furs later became the source of the country's most valuable energy reserves. The discovery of oil and natural gas in the Arctic and western Siberia turned the empire's size into a strategic asset, but also intensified competition with the West over access to those resources.

He warned that the Kremlin's contemporary focus on the Arctic is not merely about climate or environmental concerns; it is an extension of a centuries‑old belief that control of vast, sparsely populated frontiers is essential for national security and prestige.

How the imperial narrative shapes modern security doctrine

Romancov said that Russian security thinking still rests on the premise that a large, buffer‑rich territory is necessary to fend off hostile powers. This mindset explains why the Kremlin perceives NATO's eastward expansion as an existential threat, and why it reacts strongly to perceived encroachments in the "near abroad".

He pointed out that the Soviet Union inherited the imperial view of security, and that after the USSR's collapse many Russian elites continued to see the loss of former satellite states as a strategic disaster. The desire to re‑assert influence over former territories, whether in Ukraine, the Baltic region or Central Asia, can therefore be read as a continuation of an imperial security logic rather than a purely nationalist or economic calculation.

European implications

For European governments, Romancov's analysis suggests that diplomatic efforts must take into account the deep‑seated belief that size equals security. Policies that simply focus on economic incentives or military deterrence may miss the cultural and historical drivers behind Russian actions.

He urged the EU to develop a more nuanced approach that combines firm support for the sovereignty of neighbouring states with initiatives that address the economic incentives for Russia to seek resources in contested regions. In particular, the EU's energy transition could reduce Russia's leverage over European markets, but only if alternative supplies are secured and the cost burden does not fall on households.

What the Kremlin says

The Russian foreign ministry has repeatedly framed its actions in the Black Sea and the Arctic as defensive, arguing that NATO's presence threatens Russian borders. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has claimed that Russia is merely protecting its legitimate interests and that any external pressure is an attempt to contain a sovereign state.

Romancov cautioned that such statements are rooted in an imperial worldview that sees the world as a zero‑sum arena, where any gain for one side is a loss for the other. He argued that this perspective makes compromise difficult, because conceding ground is perceived as weakening the empire.

Union and labour perspectives

From a workers' point of view, the imperial legacy has mixed consequences. On the one hand, the exploitation of Siberian resources has created jobs in extractive industries, often under harsh conditions and with limited benefits for local communities. On the other hand, the centralisation of wealth in Moscow and St Petersburg has contributed to stark regional inequalities, a pattern that continues under the current regime.

Trade unions in Russia have struggled to challenge the state's narrative, facing legal restrictions and repression. In Europe, labour organisations have called for stronger sanctions on Russian energy imports, arguing that cutting off revenue streams could weaken the Kremlin's capacity to fund military operations, while also urging that sanctions be targeted to avoid harming ordinary Russian workers.

Potential fault lines

Romancov warned that the imperial mindset could become a source of internal tension. Managing a territory that stretches across eleven time zones demands massive infrastructure investment, yet the Russian state often prioritises military spending over social services. This imbalance fuels discontent in peripheral regions, where populations feel neglected and where separatist sentiments can emerge.

He cited the 2022‑23 protests in the Far East over the construction of a nuclear power plant as an example of how local grievances can clash with Moscow's strategic ambitions. If the state continues to pursue expansionist projects without addressing the socioeconomic needs of its citizens, the paradox of size may turn into a catalyst for instability.

Looking ahead

Romancov concluded that the Russian empire's historical logic is unlikely to disappear overnight. The challenge for Europe is to devise policies that recognise the deep‑rooted nature of that logic while protecting the rights of smaller states and the welfare of ordinary people on both sides of the border.

He suggested three practical steps: first, maintain a credible defensive posture in Eastern Europe; second, accelerate the EU's diversification of energy supplies to reduce dependence on Russian hydrocarbons; third, support civil society and independent media in Russia and its neighbour­hoods, offering alternatives to the state‑controlled narrative of inevitable expansion.

Only by confronting the historical drivers of Russian behaviour, Romancov argued, can Europe hope to prevent the empire's old ambitions from turning into new crises.