The Russian parliamentary elections that opened on Friday and run through Sunday offer voters a choice between parties that all endorse the war in Ukraine. The liberal Yabloko party, which had merely hinted that the conflict no longer made sense, was barred from the ballot on the grounds that questioning the "special military operation" amounts to defeatism. For the Kremlin, the vote is less about competition than about manufacturing a turnout figure that can be presented as popular ratification of the invasion.

Filip Scherf, a Czech analyst of Russian politics, told Denník N that the election is a stress test for a system of "managed democracy" built over two and a half decades. The novelty this year is not repression at polling stations but the inclusion of the four Ukrainian regions Moscow claims to have annexed. Organising voting there is a logistical gamble designed to produce a propaganda contrast: Russia holds elections, Kyiv does not.

More consequential for the war's trajectory is the emergence of a nationalist veteran caucus. Thousands of men who have fought in Ukraine are now candidates for the Duma, many running on the United Russia ticket but espousing views to the right of Vladimir Putin himself. Scherf argues that this cohort, celebrated as a new elite, will shrink the president's already narrow room for manoeuvre. "Paradoxically, veterans' arrival will strengthen the Kremlin's chauvinist narrative and narrow the president's already limited wiggle room," he said.

A ballot without dissent

Russian law requires parties to collect tens of thousands of signatures to register, a threshold that the authorities can invalidate at will. Yabloko's exclusion followed a pattern: any formation that might channel anti-war sentiment is disqualified before the campaign begins. The remaining parties, the Communist Party, A Just Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the ruling United Russia, span the conventional left-right spectrum but share a pre-imposed consensus on foreign policy. Competition is permitted only on "safe" issues such as pensions, utilities or local infrastructure.

For Russians who oppose the war, the options are bleak. They can vote for the "systemic opposition" parties that have acquiesced to the invasion, stay at home and depress turnout, or spoil their ballots. Scherf dismisses the latter gestures as acts of desperation with no practical effect on the result. Street protest carries the risk of criminal prosecution under laws that equate criticism of the armed forces with treason. Online dissent is monitored and punished. The system, in short, has closed every institutional outlet for opposition to the war.

Putin's personal intervention

The president has never formally joined United Russia, preferring to pose as a figure above party politics. Yet he has thrown himself into this campaign with unusual visibility. Rather than discussing social policy or the economy, Putin has advanced what Scherf calls a "meta-narrative": Russia is defending itself against a malevolent West, has been betrayed by others, will never be brought to its knees and will fight through to victory. United Russia politicians, led by former president Dmitry Medvedev, immediately echoed the language, turning a routine legislative election into a plebiscite on the war's existential framing.

That framing serves a domestic purpose. By presenting the conflict as a struggle for national survival, the Kremlin seeks to mobilise a patriotic segment of the population while rendering the apathetic segment politically inert. Scherf identifies two broad currents: one that wants to demonstrate solidarity with the regime, and another that is "fed up, frustrated and feels powerless", unwilling to vote but also unsure how to express dissent. The polarisation is itself a product of the war, which has dragged politics into demographics that previously accepted the implicit bargain of stability in exchange for political quiescence.

The veteran factor

The most striking development is the candidacy of combat veterans. Their numbers are significant enough to form a distinct faction in the next Duma. Many are decorated officers who have commanded units in Ukraine. Their rhetoric is uncompromising: total victory, no negotiations, expansion of Russian control. Some have explicitly criticised the Kremlin for insufficient ruthlessness. This places them to the right of Putin, who has occasionally floated ceasefire language, however insincerely, to keep diplomatic channels open.

Scherf warns that the veteran caucus will act as a ratchet. Once seated, they will demand escalation, denounce any compromise as betrayal, and use their moral authority as front-line fighters to shame officials who waver. The Kremlin, having elevated them as heroes, will find it difficult to contain them. The result is a dynamic in which the regime's own propaganda creates a constituency that makes de-escalation politically dangerous for the leadership.

Conscription absent from the campaign

One issue that unites both patriotic and apathetic Russians is fear of mobilisation. United Russia's election programme was unveiled only in the final weeks, and even then it barely mentions forced enlistment. No candidate dares promise that another call-up will not happen, that would be a lie, since the decision rests with the defence ministry and the president. None dares say it will happen, because that would be electoral poison. The silence is deafening. Scherf notes that in previous cycles the Communist Party benefited from protest votes; this time the Communists have aligned themselves with the war effort, leaving no parliamentary vehicle for anti-mobilisation sentiment.

The omission reflects a broader calculation. The Kremlin needs high turnout to legitimise the parliament, but it cannot afford a campaign dominated by the one issue that touches every household with a son, brother or husband of fighting age. By keeping mobilisation off the agenda, the authorities hope to herd voters into a ritual of participation that asks nothing of them except presence.

Occupied territories as electoral theatre

Voting in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions is a logistical operation conducted under military occupation. International observers are absent. Ukrainian residents who remain face pressure to vote, often at gunpoint or in exchange for humanitarian aid. The results will be announced with precision, showing overwhelming support for United Russia. Moscow will then cite the turnout as proof that the populations of these regions have chosen Russia.

The European Union and its member states have already declared they will not recognise the outcome. The European Parliament passed a resolution in July condemning the "pseudo-elections" in occupied Ukraine and calling for additional sanctions on Russian officials involved in organising them. The practical effect on the ground is nil; the Kremlin proceeds regardless, because the domestic audience is the primary target.

Implications for European security

A Duma with a hardened nationalist veteran bloc reduces the likelihood of any Russian diplomatic initiative that could lead to a negotiated settlement. It also signals to European capitals that the Russian political system is moving toward greater militarisation, not away from it. For EU policymakers, the election confirms that the current leadership has no intention of reversing course. The veteran caucus will press for increased defence spending, further mobilisation of the economy, and a harder line against any European involvement in Ukraine's reconstruction or security guarantees.

This has direct consequences for European defence planning. The European Commission's proposed European Defence Industrial Strategy, the debate over joint procurement, and the discussion of a European defence commissioner all assume a long-term threat from a Russia that is politically committed to expansion. The Duma election reinforces that assumption. It also complicates any future European attempt to engage a post-Putin Russia, because the veteran faction will survive a leadership change and will claim the mantle of the "true" patriotic cause.

Workers and the war economy

The war has reshaped the Russian labour market. Defence factories are running three shifts, drawing workers from civilian sectors with wages that private employers cannot match. Unemployment is at a historic low, but real wages are eroded by inflation driven by military spending. Trade unions, incorporated into the state structure since Soviet times, have not challenged the conversion of the economy to war production. The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia endorsed the "special military operation" in 2022 and has since focused on securing hazard pay for workers in defence plants.

For ordinary Russian households, the election changes nothing. Prices for food, fuel and housing continue to rise. The government's social payments, one-off bonuses for veterans, subsidies for families of contract soldiers, are targeted and temporary. The structural shift toward a war economy means that civilian investment, healthcare and education face sustained pressure. The Duma that emerges from this vote will rubber-stamp budgets that prioritise the front over the home front.

No exit in sight

Scherf's assessment is sobering. The election will produce a parliament that is more hawkish than the one it replaces. The veteran faction will act as a brake on any impulse toward compromise. Putin, having framed the war as existential, cannot easily pivot without losing the constituency he has mobilised. The systemic opposition parties will continue to play their assigned role, providing a veneer of pluralism while voting for every measure the Kremlin proposes.

For Europe, the message is clear. The Russian political system has closed the door on internal correction. The next Duma will be an instrument of escalation, not a forum for debate. European governments must plan for a neighbour that is more militarised, more repressive and less predictable than at any point since the Cold War. The sham election is not a sideshow; it is a signal of where the system is headed.