A collaborative investigation by The Insider, Der Spiegel and Le Monde has obtained minutes of secret meetings held in Guangzhou, China, where engineers from the country’s leading space and defence organisations outlined a three‑phase plan to reduce the operational capability of SpaceX’s Starlink network.

Phase one: diplomatic pressure

The first phase calls for a coordinated diplomatic campaign by Russia and China aimed at persuading the United Nations and national regulators to adopt stricter low‑Earth‑orbit (LEO) satellite rules. The campaign would cite collision risk and alleged breaches of space law as justification for tighter controls on frequency bands and orbital slots that Starlink intends to use.

Phase two: spectrum and jamming

The second phase proposes occupying the frequency bands and orbital slots earmarked for Starlink and creating a joint electromagnetic‑jamming system. The system would lower data throughput without destroying individual satellites, thereby degrading the service while avoiding overt destruction.

Phase three: cyber and kinetic threats

The final phase envisions cyber operations and the development of low‑cost anti‑satellite weapons capable of physically destroying satellites. The investigation found no evidence that such kinetic weapons have been employed yet, but research into kinetic‑kill methods is ongoing.

Starlink’s role in the Ukraine conflict has made it a focal point of the plan. Since 2022, after the Ukrainian defence ministry, then led by Mykhailo Fedorov, signed a partnership with SpaceX, portable satellite terminals have been supplied to frontline units. The terminals are small enough for infantry to carry and provide high‑speed broadband where Russian forces have jammed or destroyed ground communications. Ukrainian officials say the terminals enable real‑time video, command‑and‑control communications and coordination of drone attacks on Russian logistics. Fedorov praised the service, describing Elon Musk’s company as a genuine supporter of freedom.

Later, Fedorov introduced a technical control that allowed only pre‑approved terminals to operate, effectively blocking use by Russian‑controlled forces. The measure reportedly cut off Russian‑controlled units and forced a pause in Russian offensives in several sectors.

In response, Russia’s defence conglomerate Rostec announced a domestic satellite internet project also called “Starlink” to lessen reliance on foreign providers. Analysts note that Russia’s existing satellite fleet is far smaller than SpaceX’s constellation. Ukrainian expert Yevhen Pronin said achieving parity would require close cooperation with China, which possesses the industrial base and launch capacity for large constellations.

Rostec also unveiled a “Spiderweb” system – a reinforced metal cage intended to protect oil depots and power stations from drones up to 200 kg. The US Institute for the Study of War characterised the Spiderweb system as a rudimentary solution that highlights broader shortcomings in Russian air‑defence.

European and NATO implications

The European Union is pursuing a European Space Strategy aimed at autonomous access to space, a competitive satellite market and protection of critical communications. If Russia and China succeed in influencing regulators to restrict certain frequency bands, European LEO projects such as the French‑German OneWeb expansion and the UK‑led Project Kuiper partnership could encounter additional licensing obstacles.

Potential kinetic attacks on satellites could raise insurance premiums and discourage private investment in the sector. The German Bundestag’s Committee on Digital Affairs warned that the militarisation of commercial satellite constellations threatens security and the stability of the global communications market. The French Senate called for a European framework to safeguard civilian satellite services from hostile state actions.

The US Pentagon’s Space Command highlighted the vulnerability of LEO constellations to electronic warfare and kinetic anti‑satellite weapons, noting implications for NATO’s collective defence posture. A senior US defence official briefed NATO allies that commercial space assets can become strategic targets and that NATO must develop doctrines to protect them.

Pronin told the Slovak daily Denník N that the importance of the findings lies in the advantage Starlink has given Ukraine, not in an immediate threat of total disruption. Ukraine is seeking to diversify its satellite communications by using the EU’s Copernicus Emergency Management Service and exploring partnerships with other commercial providers.

The European Commission’s DG CONNECT is drafting a Space Security Regulation that would require satellite operators to meet minimum resilience standards and report interference attempts to an EU authority. The European Space Agency is accelerating research into laser‑based debris removal and on‑orbit servicing technologies to repair or remove damaged satellites.

European trade unions are advocating for training programmes for engineers, cybersecurity specialists and technicians for an emerging space‑defence sector, while cautioning against excessive militarisation.

The investigation concludes that the Russia‑China partnership represents a calculated effort to change the rules of engagement in space, with potential repercussions for the security of commercial satellite services and the broader geopolitical balance.