When a hypothetical scenario places German voters in the grip of a dual security shock, a US withdrawal from NATO and a Russian invasion of Estonia, the immediate reaction is a surge in demand for higher defence spending and stronger European security cooperation. Yet, a new study finds that this shift in policy preferences does not translate into a retreat from the far‑right, raising doubts about the so‑called security dividend that mainstream parties have long counted on.

The research, conducted by Ala' Alrababah of Bocconi University, Rachel Myrick of Duke University and their colleague, surveyed a representative sample of German citizens in early 2024. Participants were randomly assigned to read either a neutral description of domestic politics or a vivid narrative in which former US president Donald Trump pulls American troops out of NATO, effectively dismantling the alliance, while Russian forces cross into Estonia, a NATO and EU member. After exposure, respondents were asked about their priorities for political leaders and their party preferences.

Policy priorities swing towards security

Unsurprisingly, those who read the threat scenario expressed a markedly higher willingness to endorse increased defence budgets and deeper collaboration within the European Defence Agency. They also placed greater weight on a politician's foreign‑policy experience, judgement and competence in handling security crises. In quantitative terms, support for higher defence spending rose by roughly eight percentage points among the threat‑exposed group compared with the control group.

These findings echo a familiar pattern in international‑relations theory: external danger tends to reward incumbents and parties perceived as capable of safeguarding national interests. In the German context, the centre‑right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz, saw its hypothetical support increase by 4.4 points after the security vignette. The boost came primarily from voters who had previously backed the liberal Free Democratic Party, the Social Democrats or the Greens.

Far‑right support remains stubbornly intact

What the study did not anticipate was the resilience of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Despite the heightened sense of danger, the party's backing remained virtually unchanged. Over 96 % of respondents who had indicated a prior AfD vote stayed with the party after the scenario, even though they reported similar shifts in policy preferences to the rest of the electorate, favouring stronger defence and more decisive foreign‑policy leadership.

"The AfD's core constituency appears to separate issue‑based preferences from party loyalty," the authors note. "Even when confronted with a clear external threat, these voters do not abandon the party that has positioned itself as a critic of the mainstream consensus on Russia and NATO." This observation mirrors recent electoral outcomes in Germany's eastern states, where the AfD captured more than 38 % of the vote in Mecklenburg‑Vorpommern and 43.8 % in Saxony‑Anhalt, while the CDU failed to clear the five‑percent threshold in the former.

The German experience is not isolated. Across the EU, far‑right parties have either maintained or increased their vote shares since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In 2021, the average far‑right vote in the EU stood at about 13 %; by the 2023‑24 elections, that figure had risen to nearly 20 %. The persistence of these movements suggests that security concerns alone are insufficient to erode their appeal.

Why the security dividend may be a myth

Traditional political science models argue that voters gravitate towards parties with proven governance records when faced with existential threats. The German experiment, however, indicates a more nuanced reality. While mainstream parties do reap a modest boost, the effect is confined to the centre of the political spectrum; it does not pull voters away from the extremes.

One possible explanation lies in the way far‑right parties have rebranded their security narratives. The AfD, for instance, has softened its overtly pro‑Russian rhetoric in recent years, focusing instead on criticism of perceived NATO overreach, the cost of defence spending and the impact of sanctions on ordinary Germans. By framing security policy as a domestic economic issue, the party can appeal to voters who are anxious about both external threats and the household budget.

Another factor is the growing scepticism towards the United States among segments of the European electorate. The hypothetical Trump‑led withdrawal from NATO resonated with existing doubts about American reliability, a sentiment that has been amplified by recent US disengagement from European defence initiatives. When the US is portrayed as an unreliable partner, parties that champion European strategic autonomy, even if they are critical of sanctions on Russia, can capture the security narrative without being labelled as naïve or pro‑Moscow.

Implications for the 2027 election cycle

France, Spain, Poland and Italy are all slated to hold national elections in 2027, a year that could see the continent's security environment further deteriorate. The war in Ukraine drags on, tensions between the US and Iran flare, and the prospect of a fragmented NATO looms. In such a climate, mainstream parties across Europe may be tempted to assume that a security‑focused campaign will automatically marginalise extremist forces.

The German evidence warns against that complacency. If voters continue to demand stronger defence policies while simultaneously rewarding parties that question the prevailing consensus on Russia, the political centre could find itself squeezed between two pressures: the need to appear tough on security and the risk of alienating voters who feel burdened by rising defence taxes.

Trade unions and workers' organisations have already voiced concern that a surge in defence spending could be financed by cuts to social programmes or by higher taxes on labour. The European Trade Union Confederation has called for any increase in defence budgets to be matched by safeguards for workers' rights and public services. Without such guarantees, the security dividend may translate into a heavier fiscal load for households rather than a genuine improvement in safety.

For policymakers, the lesson is clear: relying solely on external threats to consolidate the centre is a risky strategy. To win back voters from the far‑right, mainstream parties will need to address the underlying economic anxieties that fuel populist appeal, affordable energy, decent wages and robust public services, while articulating a credible vision for European defence that does not depend on a single external patron.

In the meantime, the study's authors stress the importance of continued monitoring. "Future surveys should test whether real‑world events, such as a further escalation in Ukraine or a concrete US policy shift, produce the same pattern," they write. "If the centre's gains remain confined to the moderate bloc and the far‑right's base stays intact, Europe may have to confront a dual challenge: heightened security demands and a resilient populist opposition."

As the 2027 elections approach, the German warning serves as a reminder that security concerns do not automatically translate into political moderation. Voters may indeed want stronger defence, but they will also look for parties that can protect their livelihoods and uphold democratic values in an increasingly uncertain world.